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THE SUPREME COURT - LEADING CASES
be appropriate, but without further definition, it may also leave lower
courts to take that step in the wrong direction - and thus jeopardize
the individual liberty of private actors chilled by a vague standard.
H. Takings Clause
Regulatory Takings. - Ever since Justice Holmes declared in 1922
that a regulation of property that "goes too far . . . will be recognized
as a taking,"' the Supreme Court has struggled to identify when a land
use restriction steps over that line. The Court has for the most part
eschewed categorical rules for determining when regulations go "too
far," choosing instead to engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir-
ies,"'2 balancing the rights of property owners with the needs of society
at large. Last Term, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,3 the Court reaf-
firmed its skeptical attitude toward bright line rules in the takings con-
text, holding that a state may not automatically bar an individual who
acquires property encumbered by a preexisting land use regulation
from bringing an inverse condemnation action to challenge that regu-
lation.4 But the Palazzolo majority left open the question of whether
(and how) the timing of acquisition might figure into the "ad hoc, fac-
tual inquiries" undertaken in regulatory takings cases.5 Concurring,
Justice O'Connor advised against the adoption of a categorical rule ex-
cluding that factor from the constitutional analysis, urging the judici-
ary to resist "[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in
either direction."'6 Such categorical opposition to bright line rules,7
however, obscures the fact that judicial consideration of the timing of
acquisition would not further, and would actually tend to hinder, two
core principles and policies underlying the Takings Clause. The Court
should be wary of a per se preference for legal standards, for in some
cases, a more contextual inquiry might demonstrate the desirability of
a bright line rule.
Anthony Palazzolo's action for just compensation arose out of a re-
fusal by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, an
agency created in 1971 to protect the state's coastal wetlands areas, to
grant him a development permit for his coastal property.8 Palazzolo
first became involved with the property in 1959, when he, along with
1 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
2 Penn Cent. Tansp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
3 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
4 Id. at 2464.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2467 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7 Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, x9gr Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, io6 HARV. L. REV. 22, 92 (1992) (noting Justice O'Connor's "affinity for stan-
dards, balancing, and linedrawing").
8 See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456.
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several associates, formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) to purchase and
develop the shoreline parcels.9 SGI's attempts to develop the land in
the 196os were unsuccessful, and in 1978 its corporate charter was re-
voked, 10 causing the wetlands property to pass automatically to Palaz-
zolo, who was by then the corporation's sole shareholder." Of course,
by the time Palazzolo acquired the parcels, land use restrictions prom-
ulgated by the Rhode Island Council were in effect. 12  Pursuant to
those regulations, the Council denied Palazzolo's two requests for de-
velopment permits, finding that his proposal to build a private beach
club did not qualify for the "special exceptions" the regulations pro-
vided for development projects serving a "compelling public pur-
pose. 1' 3 Palazzolo appealed the ruling as inconsistent with state ad-
ministrative law principles, but the state courts affirmed the Council's
decision.14
After losing his administrative appeal, Palazzolo filed an inverse
condemnation action in state court, asserting that the state's wetlands
regulations had deprived his property of "all economically beneficial
use," and thus constituted a "total taking" for which the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments required that he be paid just compensation. 15
After the trial judge denied his claims, Palazzolo appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island.16 The state's highest court found, as a
preliminary matter, that Palazzolo's claim should be dismissed on
ripeness grounds. 17 Nevertheless, the court went on to declare that re-
gardless of any procedural bars, Palazzolo's action for just compensa-
tion would fail on the merits. Because Palazzolo could still develop
the upland portion of his property (an area that retained a value of
approximately $200,000), the coastal regulations had not deprived him
of "all economically beneficial use" of his land.'8 But even if the sub-
9 Id. at 2455.
10 Id. at 2455-56. The state revoked SGI's charter for failure to pay corporate income taxes.
Id. at 2456.
11 Id. at 2456. After SGI acquired the property, Palazzolo bought out his associates and be-
came the sole shareholder of SGI. Id. at 2455.
12 See id. at 2456.
13 Id. The Council denied Palazzolo's initial proposal to develop the property for lack of
specificity. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1029-32 (1992) (holding that, in
most circumstances, when a regulation "deprives land of all economically beneficial use," the state
must pay the property owner just compensation).
16 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000).
17 Id. at 714. Each of Palazzolo's applications for development permits proposed to develop
the entire wetlands region. Given the ambitious nature of the plans, the state court could not rule
out the possibility that the Council might have permitted a less grandiose project. Because the
court could not determine the extent to which the regulations encumbered Palazzolo's property, it
found that his claim was not ripe for judicial review. See id.
18 Id. at 714-15.
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stantial diminution in the value of Palazzolo's property might be said,
in effect, to constitute a total taking, 19 his action would fail. Palazzolo
had acquired the land from SGI when the coastal regulations were in
effect, and had thus obtained property already encumbered by the
land use limitations. Because Palazzolo had never acquired the right
to fill the wetlands region, the state could not be said to have taken it
from him.2 0 Palazzolo's status as a post-enactment acquirer similarly
doomed any partial takings claim under Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York. 2 1 Observing that one prong of the Penn Cen-
tral test was whether the state had interfered with a property owner's
"reasonable investment-backed expectations," the state court found Pa-
lazzolo could not reasonably have expected to develop his land in vio-
lation of existing regulations. 22
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 23 first found that Pa-
lazzolo's claim was ripe, 24 and then went on to consider the state's as-
sertion that an individual who acquires a piece of property
encumbered by a preexisting land use regulation should be automati-
19 The state court acknowledged that the $200,000 figure was substantially lower than the
$3,450,000 profit Palazzolo had contemplated earning. Id.
20 See id. at 715-17.
21 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22 See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 717. The Penn Central three-factor test advises a court evaluat-
ing a potential regulatory taking to consider: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the
economic impact on the individual involved; and (3) whether or not the regulation unduly inter-
fered with the property owner's investment-backed expectations. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Court indicated one year after Penn Central
that the third prong of the test would involve an objective inquiry. See Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (identifying one factor of the Penn Central test as the degree to
which a regulation has interfered with an owner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations")
(emphasis added).
23 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion; Justice Stevens joined in part.
24 Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463. Justice Kennedy observed that the "central question" was
whether a claimant had obtained a "final decision" from the relevant regulatory body regarding
the extent to which it would authorize development on his property. Id. at 2458. The Council's
refusal on two occasions to grant Palazzolo a permit, combined with the "unequivocal nature of
the wetlands regulations," which exempted few development projects, "ma[de] plain" that the
property owner would be unable to engage in any filling or development on his wetlands property.
Id. at 2458-59. The Court found it immaterial that Palazzolo had not submitted any proposal to
develop only the upland portion of his property. See id. at 2460. During the state court litigation,
the government, in defending against Palazzolo's total takings claim, had assigned a set value of
$200,000 to that parcel, the precise value used by Palazzolo in bringing his Penn Central partial
takings action. Id. at 2457, 246o-61. Having already acknowledged the accuracy of the $200,000
figure, the state could not now maintain that the value of the upland region was in dispute. Id. at
246o. Because Palazzolo had taken the "reasonable and necessary steps" to establish the bounda-
ries of permissible activity on his land, the Court found there was sufficient information to deter-
mine whether the state regulation had gone "too far." See id. at 2459-60. Thus, his claim was
ripe for federal court review. Id. at 2460.
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cally barred from bringing an action for just compensation. 2 5 The
Court found that such a rule would give the state an inordinate
amount of power over property rights. If subsequent purchasers were
deemed to be on notice of whatever state regulations were in effect,
and were thereby prevented from bringing an inverse condemnation
action to challenge those regulations, the state would have unfettered
power to "shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-
backed expectations. '26 "The State," the Court declared, "may not put
so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle. '27 Justice Ken-
nedy explained that the central question was not whether the property
owner could have anticipated the state's regulation, but instead
whether the regulation was so "unreasonable or onerous" as to require
payment of just compensation.2 8  The timing of acquisition was not
critical to that more objective analysis: "Just as a prospective enact-
ment ... can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because
it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments
are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or
title." 29
The Court observed that the state's argument ignored the critical
relationship between the pre-enactment property owner and the post-
enactment purchaser. A pre-enactment owner who cannot bring a tak-
ings claim on her own behalf - perhaps because difficult financial
circumstances prevent her from holding on to her land - should re-
tain the right to transfer that cause of action against the government to
a post-enactment purchaser.30  The ability to transfer the potential
claim for just compensation would allow the pre-enactment owner to
sell the property for a higher price, and thereby recoup some of the
losses suffered at the hands of the government. If the legal rule for-
bade a subsequent purchaser from bringing a takings action, the value
25 Id. at 2462.
26 Id. Professor Laurence Tribe has identified the pitfalls of defining property rights in terms
of individuals' subjective expectations, if those expectations depend solely upon existing positive
law:
To the degree that private property is to be respected in the face of republican and posi-
tivist visions, it becomes necessary to resist even an explicit government proclamation
that all property acquired in the jurisdiction is held subject to government's limitless
power to do with it what government wishes.... But this shows that the expectations
protected by the Uust Compensation Clause] must .... achieve protected status not be-
cause the state has deigned to accord them protection, but because constitutional norms
entitle them to protection.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-7, at 6o8 (2d ed. 1988).
27 Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Cf. id. at 2463 ("The State's rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of property,
as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was pos-
sessed prior to the regulation.'.
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of the property would be significantly lower, and the previous owner
would alone have to bear the economic burden imposed by the uncon-
stitutional taking.31 Not only would the wrong party sustain the in-
jury, but the state would go unpunished for its unconstitutional ac-
tion. 32 Such a legal rule would set up perverse incentives. As soon as
the original owner transferred her property, the state would be ab-
solved from having to pay compensation to anyone for an unconstitu-
tional taking. The Court declared: "The State may not by this means
secure a windfall for itself."33
Ultimately, however, the Court upheld the state supreme court's re-
jection of Palazzolo's total takings claim. Because the upland portion
of Palazzolo's property retained some value, he had not been deprived
of "all economically beneficial use" of his land. 34 The Court remanded
the case to the state court for reconsideration of Palazzolo's partial
takings claim under the three-factor Penn Central test in light of its
decision that a property owner's status as a post-enactment purchaser
is not an absolute bar to an inverse condemnation action.35
Concurring, Justice O'Connor suggested how the state court should
apply the Penn Central test. Although she agreed with the Court's ba-
sic holding that a party's status as a post-enactment purchaser should
not automatically nullify a claim, she insisted that the timing of acqui-
sition should factor into the Penn Central analysis. 36 The existence of
land use regulations would logically have some impact on the invest-
ment-backed expectations of an individual who acquired a piece of
property encumbered by those regulations.3 1 Principles of fairness and
justice require courts to take that impact into account: "[I]f existing
regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some property
owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is
lost."38
31 See id. Professor Richard Epstein has made a similar observation:
Even if adjustments in the price paid can protect the buyer against the risk, what then
protects the seller against a capital loss upon enactment of the restriction, itself a partial
taking, which is thereafter realized through the sale to a third party? Why is it that he
must bear the loss when it is the state that has threatened to take private property?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO-
MAIN 156 (1985).
32 See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463 (noting that the government would be allowed, "in effect,
to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause').
33 Id.
34 See id. at 2464-65.
35 Id. at 2465.
36 Id. at 2465-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]t would be just as much error to expunge this
consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance.'.
37 See id. at 2467.
38 Id.
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Justice Scalia concurred separately "to make clear that my under-
standing of ... the issues ... is not Justice O'Connor's. '39 Justice
Scalia suspected that Justice O'Connor, in focusing on "important in-
dici[a] of fairness," was envisioning the "polar horrible" that savvy
speculators who manage to predict that a particular piece of property
is encumbered by an unconstitutional regulation would reap windfalls
by, first, tricking naive property owners into selling their lands at low
prices (that reflected the restriction on development) and then bringing
the inverse condemnation actions themselves. 40  Even if some inves-
tors might reap such "windfalls" at the expense of innocent property
owners, Justice Scalia argued, "there is nothing to be said for giving
[the money] instead to the government - which not only did not lose
something it owned, but ... which acted unlawfully - indeed uncon-
stitutionally."41  Justice Scalia insisted that constitutional principles
required courts to give no consideration to the timing of acquisition:
"The 'investment-backed expectations' that the law will take into ac-
count do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact
deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional. '" 42
Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part. He contended that the case should be dismissed, if at
all, because it appeared that Palazzolo did not have standing to bring
the suit.43 Justice Stevens did agree with Justice O'Connor, however,
that when a subsequent purchaser with standing brings a takings
claim, his "notice" that the regulation was in place is "relevant to the
evaluation of whether the regulation goes 'too far,' but not necessarily
dispositive. ' '44
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter, dissented,
contending that the Court erred in finding that Palazzolo's case was
ripe.45 But she also went on to note that if the property owner's claim
39 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 2467.
41 Id. at 2468 ("It is rather like eliminating the windfall that accrued to a purchaser who
bought property at a bargain rate from a thief... by making him turn over the 'unjust' profit to
the thief.").
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2470 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens explained
that a taking occurs at a set moment in time, and a court must identify that moment to determine
which party was injured by the taking. Id. at 2469-70. Palazzolo's argument indicated that the
state had impaired the use of his land by enacting the regulation. If so, then Palazzolo had no
standing to bring a claim for just compensation because he had acquired the property after the
taking and, thus, had not been injured by it. Id. at 2470-71. Justice Stevens concluded that, if
the regulations were invalid, Palazzolo could, at most, sue to enjoin their enforcement. See id. at
2468.
44 Id. at 2471 n.6.
45 Justice Ginsburg argued that because none of Palazzolo's applications had been limited to
the upland property, it was impossible to say with certainty what level of development might be
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were ripe, she would "at a minimum, agree with Justice O'Connor
... that transfer of title can impair a takings claim.
46
The contention that the timing of an acquisition should factor into
the analysis of a partial takings claim has tremendous surface appeal,
as evidenced by the enthusiasm with which five Justices endorsed that
position.47 After all, the Penn Central test encourages courts to con-
sider a property owner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations,"
expectations that would likely be influenced by the existence of a par-
ticular regulation, regardless of that regulation's actual constitutional
validity. Because the Court has consistently regarded takings law as a
series of "ad hoc, factual" inquiries, 48 it would seem illogical - inco-
herent, even - for the Court to adopt a per se rule excluding from the
analysis a fact of such obvious importance.
49
Nevertheless, not every aspect of a case that appears relevant as a
matter of fact is relevant as a matter of constitutional law.5 0  In order
allowed on that land. Id. at 2473-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She assailed the Court's assertion
that the State had somehow conceded the value of the property to be $200,000, pointing out that
the State had only assigned a value to that parcel to undercut Palazzolo's total takings claim. Id.
at 2474. Although Justice Ginsburg conceded that the Court could consider the Penn Central
claim because it had been briefly addressed by the state courts, id. at 2475, she argued that it was
"unfair" to allow Palazzolo now to use an element of the state's total taking defense to prove the
ripeness of his partial takings claim. Id. at 2476 ("Casting away fairness (and fairness to a State,
no less), the Court indulges Palazzolo's bait-and-switch maneuver.").
46 Id. at 2477 n.3. In a short dissent, Justice Breyer expressed concern about the potential for
strategic behavior in total takings cases. Landowners might try to construct a total takings claim
by selling (and perhaps repurchasing as separate pieces of property) portions of their land until
they are left with a parcel entirely encumbered by regulation. Id. at 2477 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer suggested that the problem might be aggravated in the case of a subsequent pur-
chaser, who would know which portions of her property were affected by an existing regulation.
Id. at 2477-78; cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1054 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]here is no 'objective' way to define what [the] denominator [in a total takings inquiry]
should be."); Frank L. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 8o HARV. L. REV. II65, 1193, 1233 (1967) (discussing
the problem of identifying the relevant denominator).
47 The five Justices were Justice O'Connor, see Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), and the four dissenters, see id. at 2471 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 2477 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer); id. at 2477 (Breyer, J., dissenting). No other Justice expressly endorsed Justice Scalia's
contention that the timing of acquisition was never relevant to a takings inquiry. See id. at 2467
(Scalia, J., concurring).
48 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Subsequent cases
have also noted the ad hoc nature of takings inquiries. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2466; E. En-
ters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (I998); Lucas, 505 U.S. at Iois; Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519, 529 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, I75 (1979).
49 See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50 Justice O'Connor herself has noted that certain factual circumstances may be constitution-
ally irrelevant in the equal protection context:
We know that like race, gender matters.... [Tihe import of our holding is that any cor-
relation between a juror's gender and attitudes is irrelevant as a matter of constitutional
2001]
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to determine which factors are relevant to a constitutional balancing
test, such as the "ad hoc" inquiry of just compensation law, courts
should keep in mind one basic "rule" of the use of legal standards: the
primary purpose of engaging in such contextual inquiries is to effectu-
ate "the underlying purposes or background principles or policies at
stake" in a particular legal regime. 51 So the factors most relevant to a
constitutional standard-like analysis should be the ones that further
judges' understanding of those underlying values.
Thus, in order to determine whether a particular factor merits a
spot on the balancing scales of just compensation law, courts should
ask how that factor relates to the values underlying the Takings
Clause. Although articulating any fundamental principles may seem
difficult given the complicated - perhaps even muddled - nature of
takings jurisprudence, the Court has consistently reaffirmed one cen-
tral aspiration: "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole. '5 2 The extent to which judicial consideration
of the timing of acquisition furthers (or hinders) this recognized princi-
ple of takings law should suggest whether that factor is relevant as a
matter of constitutional law.
At first glance, denying compensation to most, but not all, post-
enactment purchasers seems fully consistent with that principle. On
the one hand, a person who buys a piece of property when a regulation
is in place can take into account the extent to which the regulation de-
creases the value of the property, and pay a lower price for the encum-
bered parcel. On the other hand, as Palazzolo's case illustrates, a post-
enactment property holder who does not purchase her land on the
open market may not similarly be able to safeguard her own interests,
so it would be unfair to bar her from bringing an action for just com-
pensation. Thus, a constitutional standard enabling courts to deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular purchaser could
have insulated herself from bearing the "public burden" may seem
more likely to lead to substantively fair and just results than any hard
and fast rule.
But such a narrow focus on the interests of the post-enactment
purchaser is likely to distract a court from recognizing that the pre-
enactment property owner will "bear the public burden" if the Court
law. But to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that
gender makes no difference as a matter of fact.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 5ii U.S. 127, 148-49 (i994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51 Sullivan, supra note 7, at 60.
52 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (i96o). Numerous cases have reaffirmed this
principle. See, e.g., Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458; id. at 2466 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Eastern
Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 522; Yee, 503 U.S. at 523.
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makes it difficult for subsequent purchasers to bring actions for just
compensation. Judicial consideration of the timing of acquisition
would reduce the market value of a property encumbered by land use
regulations by decreasing the likelihood that pQst-enactment purchas-
ers could succeed in bringing an inverse condemnation action. Pre-
enactment property owners would have to accept lower prices for their
lands and, as a result, bear a larger part of the loss caused by any un-
constitutional state regulations. Factoring the timing of acquisition
into the Penn Central analysis thus suffers from the same flaw as the
absolute rule condemned by the Court in Palazzolo: it is likely to harm
the previous owner, while the government and the subsequent pur-
chaser escape essentially unscathed.
But perhaps judicial consideration of the timing of acquisition
could nonetheless be justified as a means of deterring unethical private
behavior. The judiciary might be well advised to deny compensation
to a windfall-driven post-enactment purchaser who appears to have
hoodwinked a more naive pre-enactment property holder into transfer-
ring her constitutional claim for an unjustly low price. Surely the
principles of fairness and justice underlying the Takings Clause would
not require - and, in fact, would seem to prohibit - awarding "just"
compensation to the shrewd gambler. It thus seems quite sensible for
the Court to decline to adopt a constitutional per se rule removing the
timing of acquisition from the balancing scales of just compensation
law, when a more standard-like approach might enable it to deter such
inappropriate private behavior.
But that rationale ignores one of the core policies underlying the
Just Compensation Clause - preventing unjust governmental interfer-
ence with private property rights. The principles of fairness underly-
ing the Takings Clause are not designed to police the conduct of pri-
vate actors, however unjust that behavior may seem to some members
of the Court. Like almost every other constitutional protection, the
Clause aims instead to prevent the government from acting unjustly by
interfering with constitutionally guaranteed entitlements.5 3 A narrow
emphasis on the "just deserts" of a particular property owner would
obscure what Justice Kennedy properly recognized as the central in-
quiry: the reasonableness (or lack thereof) of the governmental regula-
tion.5 4 The focus of the inquiry should be the merits of the claim, not
the merits of the claimant.
53 The exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which applies to both private and public ac-
tors. See i LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 924 (3 d ed.
2000) (observing that the Thirteenth Amendment "is not subject to a state action requirement").
54 See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462 ("The Takings Clause, . . . in certain circumstances, allows
a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the State's regulatory power is so unreasonable
or onerous as to compel compensation.').
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It is perplexing that several members of the Court seemed willing
to open the takings inquiry to any apparently relevant circumstance,
without regard to how judicial consideration of that factor might fur-
ther (or hinder) the principles and policies underlying the Takings
Clause. Perhaps those Justices' resistance to the supposed "temptation
to adopt per se rules" was based on an assumption that standards are
inherently superior to rules. It's true that in many instances, the use of
flexible standards leaves the judiciary better equipped to further prin-
ciples of fairness and justice by considering factors that would be fore-
closed by bright line rules. The Supreme Court is understandably
drawn to standard-like analyses in takings cases, each of which in-
volves distinct - and often complex - circumstances. Conducting
"ad hoc, factual inquiries" that take into account all relevant facts
would seem the most promising way of ensuring overall substantive
equality among these disparate claims. 5s
But courts still need to identify which factors are relevant. Before
simply adding another item to the balancing scales of just compensa-
tion law, the Court should examine how judicial consideration of that
factor would influence the values underlying the Takings Clause.
Sometimes, particularly when a factor (like the timing of acquisition)
sheds little light on the Court's primary inquiry (the reasonableness of
the government's action), and in fact hinders a core principle behind
the constitutional protection (the sharing of burdens), a bright line rule
eliminating that factor from the balancing test might best serve "the
Of course, even if the timing of acquisition were excluded from the analysis, a post-
enactment purchaser would still take into account the very real possibility that a regulation might
be upheld, and would thus pay a reduced price for a piece of land. As a result, a post-enactment
purchaser is likely to suffer less of an economic injury than the pre-enactment property holder.
This difference might seem particularly relevant to the calculation of the "just compensation" due
to each set of owners. In Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934), the Supreme Court ex-
plained that a property owner should be placed "in as good a position pecuniarily as if his prop-
erty had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more." Id. at 255. Courts
might find that a smaller amount of compensation is necessary to restore a post-enactment pur-
chaser to her ex ante position. See also R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations:
Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in
Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 529 (2001) (arguing that the main distinction
between pre- and post-enactment purchasers is the compensation due each set of owners). But
this approach would let the government "off the hook" for part of its unconstitutional taking, and
thus interfere with a major policy of just compensation law. So courts should hesitate before they
turn what has traditionally been a question of "whether" there has been an unconstitutional tak-
ing into a concern about "how much" compensation is due. Cf. Michelman, supra note 46, at 1233
("[Tihe test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree; it does not ask 'how much,' but rather
... 'whether or not' ... the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived
the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.').
55 Cf. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 62 ("[Rules] force the decisionmaker to treat differently cases
that are actually substantively alike in terms of the underlying principle or policy, and to treat
similarly cases that are different.").
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underlying purposes or background principles or policies at stake."5 6
Therefore, when making the choice between a more rule-like or more
standard-like approach, courts should not display a categorical prefer-
ence for one legal formula, but should "resist[]" the "temptation to
adopt what amount[s] to [a] per se rule[] in either direction."57
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. Attorney Fee Awards
Prevailing Party. - Attorney fee-shifting statutes, designed to
augment plaintiffs' incentives to litigate by creating exceptions to the
longstanding "American Rule,"' have subsidized meritorious civil
rights cases for decades.2  In 1976, Congress magnified the importance
of fee-shifting by making attorney fee awards available to virtually all
"prevailing" plaintiffs in civil rights cases.3  Their path lighted only by
sparse congressional guidance, 4 federal courts responded by awarding
fees based on the catalyst theory,5 under which a plaintiff "prevails" if
the defendant, in response to the initiation of the lawsuit, voluntarily
affords the plaintiff at least partial relief.6 Last Term, in Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources,7 the Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory,
holding that only plaintiffs who secure judgments on the merits or
court-ordered consent decrees qualify for attorney's fees as statutory
56 Id. at 6o.
57 Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 Under the American Rule, a "prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reason-
able attorneys' fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 42 1 U.S. 240,
247 (1975).
2 See generally Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in
Public Interest Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter I984, at 233 (describing the history
and theory of fee-shifting).
3 See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § i 9 88(b) (1994 & Supp. IV I998)) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."). The act was an explicit rejoinder to Alyeska. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983). Section 19 88(b) allows fee-shifting for civil rights claims arising under a variety of federal
civil rights statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 19 88(b).
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (describing the purposes of fee-shifting statutes, but
giving few specifics on the definition of "prevailing party"); S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5 (1976) (not-
ing that "parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights.., without for-
mally obtaining relief'J.
5 See Daniel L. Lowery, Comment, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-
Shifting's Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1467-69 (1993) (describing the catalyst
theory and citing lower court cases).
6 Id. No judgment or other judicial action is necessary under the catalyst theory. Id.
7 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).
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